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Abstract 
 
Intersectoral partnerships mirror the changing nature of the relationships among state, business 
and civil society organizations, and are often considered innovative mechanisms to overcome 
single actor failure in the context of globalization. This article analyzes the capacity of 
partnerships to promote sustainable change in global agrifood chains from a governance and a 
development perspective. The global coffee, cotton, and cocoa chains serve as main fields of 
application. From a governance perspective, the emergence of partnerships is largely positive 
inasmuch as partnerships act as initiators and agents of change which, although still mostly 
confined to niche markets, unfolds a chain-wide governance effect. From a development 
perspective, partnerships can be viewed critically as their top-down and business-driven nature 
leads to uncertain benefits for producers and results in the marginalization of certain 
development concerns. These differing conclusions can be explained by the fact that partnerships 
largely embody the neoliberal agenda, which raises specific questions, particularly from a 
development perspective.  
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The Rise of Partnerships in Global Agrifood Chains 
 
Over the last ten to fifteen years, intersectoral partnerships between actors from state, market and 
civil society have attracted the attention of researchers and professionals alike. By creating an 
institutionalized platform for collaboration between public and private actors, partnerships are 
often considered as innovative mechanisms to overcome single actor failure in the context of 
globalization, and advance public goods as well as private interests (Witte et al. 2000; Biermann 
et al. 2007; Schäferhoff et al. 2009). These positive credentials have placed partnerships in the 
center of the debate on what kinds of institutional arrangements are most promising to address 
complex, multilayered, and multi-scalar sustainability issues (Glasbergen 2007). 
 
Partnerships have since emerged in a variety of issue areas, ranging from international 
development (Reed and Reed 2009) and forestry (Pattberg 2005) to biodiversity (Visseren-
Hamakers et al. 2010) and climate change (Bäckstrand 2008). Especially in global agrifood 
chains, partnerships have experienced considerable growth since the late 1990s in the 
expectation that they would manage the ‘wicked problem’ (Batie 2008; Peterson 2009) of 
realizing sustainability within such chains, such as addressing environmental degradation, poor 
working conditions, and impoverishment of smallholder producers (Bitzer et al. 2008; Schouten 
and Glasbergen 2011; Fuchs et al. 2011; Dentoni and Peterson 2011). This has given rise to an 
international policy consensus on the desirability of partnerships (OECD 2006; World Bank 
2007), even though the consequences of partnerships are still poorly understood (Lund-Thomsen 
2009).  
 
Most notably, the literature on global (environmental) governance and on development studies 
pick up the debate on partnerships in global agrifood chains. Both strands seek to explain the 
emergence and implications of partnerships as new institutional arrangements, albeit it from 
different perspectives. The governance literature originates from a state-based rather top-down 
view, and focuses on the changing relationships between state, market and civil society. 
Partnerships, which encompass both state and non-state actors in different constellations, are 
studied for their potential to serve as new governance arrangements and to solve global 
sustainability problems, including problems linked to international production and consumption 
patterns. The development studies literature, on the other hand, is characterized by a bottom-up, 
producer oriented perspective, and looks at constraints to and solutions for rural development. 
Partnerships, which have become increasingly common with development organizations, are 
analyzed for their potential to serve as new development tools by contributing to different 
development objectives, including poverty reduction and agricultural growth. 
 
As key points, both the governance and development studies literature explore partnerships as 
new institutional arrangements with greater potential problem-solving capacity. However, 
important questions remain unanswered as regards the capacity of partnerships to deliver on their 
proposed added value and on the type of change partnerships promote. Therefore, this article 
focuses on some of the issues of this debate in order to contribute to a better understanding of 
partnerships in global agrifood chains, thereby providing lessons for the broader theory on 
partnerships. More specifically, the article aims to analyze the capacity of partnerships to 
promote sustainable change in global agrifood chains, and reflect on partnerships from a 
governance and a development perspective. 
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Intersectoral partnerships are here defined as collaborative, institutionalized arrangements 
between actors from two or more sectors of society which aim at the provision and/or protection 
of collective goods (Glasbergen 2007; Schäferhoff et al. 2009). Partnerships are characterized by 
a complementarity of actors’ roles, which, in theory, allows for a division of labor, risks, and 
responsibilities among participating actors (Narrod et al. 2009). While this paper uses the term 
intersectoral partnerships, other terms found in the literature include cross-sector partnerships, 
multi-stakeholder alliances, public-private partnerships, global public policy networks or global 
action networks. The capacity of partnerships is viewed as an outcome-oriented concept and 
understood as the ability to promote sustainable change in global agrifood chains by means of 
pursuing distinct strategies and performing distinct functions. Arguably, this ability is partly 
influenced by the embeddedness of partnerships in the institutional context and in horizontal 
network relationships. In line with the two main strands of literature used in this paper, the 
capacity of partnerships can either be viewed from a governance perspective (partnerships as 
governance tools) or from a development perspective (partnerships as development tools). 
Although there are deliberate overlaps between the perspectives, the existing differences between 
them provide important insights for a systematic enquiry into the capacity of partnerships to 
promote sustainable change. Finally, sustainable change refers to a shift in the configuration and 
functioning of agrifood chains that addresses the sustainability challenges associated with them.  
 
This article analyzes the capacity of partnerships in the global coffee, cotton and cocoa chains. 
For all three commodities, the rise of partnerships since the late 1990s is closely related to the 
increased pressure on multinational companies by NGOs to reassess their responsibility for the 
conditions at the production level. Public allegations of severe environmental degradation, 
human rights abuses and widespread poverty, which began to be voiced from the mid-1990s 
onwards, posed a clear threat to corporate reputation and sales, particularly for branded 
manufacturers (Schrage and Ewing 2005). Many companies sought to protect their business by 
engaging in corporate social responsibility activities, such as partnerships (Dentoni and Peterson 
2011). Especially in the coffee and cocoa chains, the development towards partnerships 
coincided with a change in global demand towards high quality and ethical products, which 
created new markets for smallholders’ products (Giovannucci and Ponte 2005). Partnerships with 
NGOs and other development actors are among the most common means to exploit these market 
opportunities and secure supply, while demonstrating ethical business behavior (Linton 2005; 
Neilson 2007). Concerns of supply were particularly salient in the cocoa sector; considerations to 
develop new specialty markets were dominant in the case of coffee; and incentives to highlight 
responsible business behavior were the leading motives in the cotton sector. The engagement of 
NGOs and development agencies, on the other hand, is motivated by the opportunity to directly 
address unsustainable business behavior, and raise social and environmental standards at the 
production level (Weidinger and Schmitz-Hoffmann 2007; Pattberg 2005). In general, the 
objectives of partnerships are stated to encompass the promotion of sustainable production 
practices, the increase of market access and revenues for producers, and the empowerment of 
smallholder producers. Combined with other activities at the production level to assist farmers, 
many partnerships seek to achieve their objectives through the application of a variety of generic 
and product-specific sustainability standards and certification. By now standards have turned into 
a key mechanism of partnerships for promoting sustainable change (Bitzer et al. 2012b), making 
it critical to understand the effects of standards in order to understand the overall effects of 
partnerships. 
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This article is structured as follows. Section 2 sheds light on the conceptualization of 
partnerships from the perspective of the literature on global governance and from the perspective 
of the literature on development studies. Section 3 briefly elaborates the methodological 
approach taken in the article. This is followed by an analysis of the capacity of partnerships from 
the two main perspectives: Section 4 interprets the capacity of partnerships from a governance 
perspective, and section 5 focuses on the capacity of partnerships from a development 
perspective. Both sections present different viewpoints on the capacity of partnerships, which 
partly overlap, but more often appear to be at odds with each other. Differences can also be 
distinguished between partnerships in the three chains investigated, which are considered in 
section 6. Finally, section 7 seeks to explain and reflect upon the different viewpoints on the 
capacity of partnerships presented in sections 4 and 5, offering an overall interpretation of the 
typical biases partnerships seem to imply.  
 
Theoretical Perspectives on Partnerships in Global Agrifood Chains 
 
Conceptualization of Partnerships in the Governance Literature 
 
The governance literature focuses on the changing relationships between state, market and civil 
society, and the manifestation of new ‘governance’ arrangements that include both state and non-
state actors, such as partnerships. Various scholars conceptualize their emergence as a response 
to the decreasing capacities of the state to solve the manifold problems posed by global change 
(Haufler 2003; Jessop 1998; Stoker 1998). Accelerated levels of globalization and the cross-
border nature of major contemporary sustainability problems create new interdependencies 
between actors, and render governments unable to effectively act unilaterally (Biermann and 
Dingwerth 2004). As a result, private actors have become involved in governance processes in 
order to counteract the perceived governance gap, i.e., the absence or weakness of governmental 
regulation (Haas 2004). This has led to a fundamental change in the state-market-society 
relations towards increased cooperation among actors (Jessop 1998), reflecting a “new image of 
the manageable society” (Glasbergen 2007, 16). Governance draws more and more on the 
involvement of actors beyond government, and rests on shared responsibility (Lemos and 
Agrawal 2006). The implications of this development for the liberal-democratic order are widely 
debated. Although governance is suggested to be able to address the inefficiencies of state action 
(Lemos and Agrawal 2006), scholars caution that governance initiatives, such as partnerships, 
frequently exhibit weak participatory foundations and struggle with legitimacy and 
accountability deficits (Stoker 1998; Glasbergen 2007; Bäckstrand 2008; Kaan and Liese 2011). 
Also in terms of their potential to serve as new governance instruments and solve global 
sustainability problems, the evidence of partnerships’ effects remains largely inconclusive, and is 
often contested. While partnerships have been shown to contribute to agenda-setting, knowledge 
production, and discourse formation (Pattberg 2005), the picture is less clear with respect to their 
actual output. Research suggests that partnerships fulfill rule-setting functions to establish rules 
and norms for sustainable production and business behavior (Andonova et al. 2009; Visseren-
Hamakers and Glasbergen 2007). Yet, they perform considerably worse when it comes to policy 
and rule implementation (Biermann et al. 2007; Pattberg 2010). The capacity of partnerships to 
address global governance problems thus appears ambiguous. 
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Conceptualization of Partnerships in the Development Literature 
 
The development literature examines partnerships in the context of a paradigm shift in the 
political economy of international development in the 1990s (Van Tulder and Fortanier 2009; 
Reed and Reed 2009). Firstly, this refers to the increasing recognition of the inability and failure 
of individual actors – be they market actors, governments, donors, or civil society organizations 
– to solve the development problems associated with global agrifood chains (Kolk et al. 2008). 
Such a situation is to be addressed through multi-actor collaboration where the capacities and 
bottom-up orientation of development agencies and NGOs can be joined with the resources and 
market knowledge of business (Utting and Zammit 2009). More fundamentally, partnerships 
prescribe a new, active role of business in development. Previously regarded as the “enemies, 
unconscious engines, or ungrateful beneficiaries of development” (Bendell 2005, 363), 
businesses are now acknowledged for their potential to contribute to development. This concurs 
with the new mainstream development discourse, emphasizing long-term interaction, goal 
alignment and mutual understanding between different actors as key ingredients for institutional 
change (Van Tulder and Fortanier 2009). This is most pronounced in global agrifood chains, 
where large multinational companies have considerable influence on how trade is conducted, and 
are therefore needed for any type of chain-wide change (Weidinger and Schmitz-Hoffmann 
2007; World Bank 2007). While the donor discourse tends to emphasize the potential of 
partnerships to improve the position of farmers in global agrifood chains and to promote 
sustainable production practices, little is known on their impact and effectiveness. On the one 
hand, this lack of knowledge is caused by the general difficulty to measure the outcomes of any 
types of development intervention (Blowfield 2007). On the other hand, observers suggest that 
different stakeholders may not want to know the effects of partnerships, as it allows them to 
capture the moral high ground without there being any hard evidence that effectiveness is lacking 
(Blowfield 2007; Lund-Thomsen 2009). Moreover, critics argue that the close contact of donor 
agencies and development NGOs with the corporate world makes partnerships susceptible to 
privileging business interests whilst doing little about the situation of the poor and marginalized 
people (Utting and Zammit 2009; Reed and Reed 2009; Gregoratti 2011). This raises questions 
about the capacity of partnerships to serve as new development tools in global agrifood chains. 
 
Analyzing the Capacity of Partnerships in Global Agrifood Chains 
 
Both strands of literature recognize the potential of partnerships, but also point out critical issues 
which cast doubt on their capacity to fulfill the hopes vested in them. The following analysis 
looks at partnerships in the global coffee, cotton and cocoa chains, and interprets their capacity 
to promote sustainable change by looking at the functions fulfilled by partnerships. Such a 
“functionalist” approach has been particularly popular in policy implementation studies to 
accommodate an outcome-oriented analysis (e.g. Skok 1995) to analyze where (policy) change 
comes from. It has also been applied to partnerships to capture and explain their capacity for 
sustainable change (e.g. Visseren-Hamakers and Glasbergen 2007; Bitzer et al. 2008). The 
following functions of agenda-setting, rule-setting, policy implementation and upscaling are 
utilized in this paper:  
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1. Agenda-setting represents the process of opening a discussion around certain issues, 
including “establishing what values are at stake and mapping out potential diagnoses of 
the roots of the problem” (Ascher 2007, p. 142). Agenda-setting can also entail the 
dismissal of other issues and questions as unimportant, i.e., keeping them off the debate.  
2. Rule-setting denotes the creation of new norms and standards regarding the production, 
processing and trading of agricultural products. Such a process of rule-setting thus stands 
in contrast to spontaneous, uncoordinated action (Pattberg 2006).  
3. Policy implementation describes the process of executing and putting into use the norms 
and standards evolving from rule-setting, possibly embedded into wider activities in the 
target locations of the new norms and standards.  
4. Upscaling refers to the extent to which successful individual initiatives are mainstreamed, 
connected to each other and unfold a durable effect (cf. Knorringa et al. 2011).  
 
All four functions are interpreted and applied in a rather broad manner to the two perspectives of 
this paper. This implies that from a governance perspective, the functions of partnerships are 
particularly relevant to explore their chain-wide steering capacity. From a development 
perspective, the functions of partnerships shed a light on their capacity at the production level, 
including the implications for rural producers and their organizations. 
 
Methodological Approach 
 
This article builds on a three year research project connected to and confronted with other 
research on this topic in the context of the Dutch-based Utrecht-Nijmegen Programme on 
Partnerships (UNPOP). The idea of this article is to present a synthesis of the key insights, to 
draw overarching conclusions and to offer fresh perspectives based on the findings and results of 
this research project. 
 
The methodological approach taken was as follows. First, a comprehensive literature review on 
partnerships, encompassing both literature on global environmental governance and literature on 
development studies, was conducted in order to construct the conceptual framework. This 
resulted in the comparative differentiation between a governance perspective and a development 
perspective on partnerships, and in the identification of four main outcome-oriented functions 
against which partnerships are assessed from each perspective.  
 
The subsequent analysis draws on primary research from previous publications by the author 
(Bitzer et al. 2008; Bitzer and Glasbergen 2010; Bitzer et al. 2011; Bitzer et al. 2012a; Bitzer et 
al. 2012b). Between these five papers, a total of 82 partnerships were assessed, including 16 
partnerships in the coffee chain, 5 partnerships in the global cotton chain, all through qualitative 
research, and 55 partnerships in the global cocoa chain through a combination of quantitative and 
qualitative research methods (see Table 1 for more details on the methods used concerning the 
partnerships in each chain). Data on these partnerships was collected in the 2007-2010 period, 
among others through literature reviews, analyses of “partnership documents” (data made 
available by partnerships, including plans, status reports, impact evaluations, sales contracts, 
presentations, websites, etc.) and analyses of secondary literature (all other documents and 
literature on the case studies made available mostly through an internet search). Over 70 in-depth 
semi-structured interviews in person or by phone were conducted with partnership members and 
Bitzer                                                                                                                       Volume15, Special Issue B, 2012 
 
 2012 International Food and Agribusiness Management Association (IFAMA). All rights reserved. 
 
 
19 
experts from business, NGOs, development agencies, governments, international organizations, 
and producer organizations. Participant observation in stakeholder meetings and a two months 
field trip to partnerships’ sites as well as smallholder coffee and cocoa plantations in Peru in 
2008 complement the data collected. 
 
Table 1. Partnerships studied in each chain and methods used 
Case studies Data methods and sources Reference 
16 coffee partnerships  49 semi-structured in-depth interviews 
 Literature review 
 Secondary document analysis 
 Partnership document analysis 
 Participant observation 
Bitzer et al. 2008 
Bitzer et al. 2011 
Bitzer et al. 2012b 
5 cotton partnerships  12 semi-structured in-depth interviews 
 Literature review 
 Secondary document analysis 
 Partnership document analysis 
Bitzer and Glasbergen 2010 
55 cocoa partnerships  18 semi-structured in-depth interviews 
 Literature review 
 Secondary document analysis 
 Partnership document analysis 
 Participant observation 
Bitzer et al. 2012a 
 
The reliance on primary research from previous publications had the advantage of offering 
different theoretical and empirical perspectives on the capacity of partnerships, both from a 
governance and a development angle. The diversity of case studies provided insights into an 
array of issues related to partnerships, and facilitated a systematic inquiry surrounding the 
capacity of partnerships to promote sustainable change. At the same time, two main limitations 
regarding this approach can be identified. Firstly, whilst the author holds primary knowledge of 
all case studies reviewed, the reliance on previously collected data implied that the case studies 
were originally not explored according to the conceptual framework applied in this article, but 
served a different, albeit related research purpose concerning partnerships. Secondly, the analysis 
of this paper only deals with a certain number of partnerships in the coffee, cotton and cocoa 
chains, limiting the generalizability of the results to all partnerships in these chains and even 
more so to the entire partnership phenomenon in global agrifood chains. Thus, the following 
analysis needs to be interpreted in the context of these limitations. 
 
Partnerships from a Governance Perspective 
 
From a governance perspective, the capacity of partnerships refers to their ability to solve the 
‘governance problem’ in global agrifood chains, that is, the lack of governance mechanisms to 
ensure the sustainable production and trade of commodities. Partnerships address the governance 
problem to varying degrees by contributing to the spread of sustainability values, by establishing 
private rules for agricultural production, by implementing activities at the production level aimed 
at the transfer of technical skills, or by forming networked structures and creating linkages to 
each other, thereby reproducing institutional opportunities. 
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Agenda-Setting: The Spread of Sustainability Values along Agrifood Chains 
 
As noted also in other issue areas (e.g. Witte et al. 2000), partnerships act as important agenda-
setters, and have triggered a debate on sustainability in the coffee, cocoa, and cotton chains. On a 
broad level, this concerns the spread of values based on environmentally friendly and socially 
responsible business behavior (Bitzer et al. 2008). Since the issues at stake are complex, 
covering a variety of complicated cause-effect relationships and concerning different types of 
producers, manufacturers and retailers (Kolk 2011), partnerships vary in their interpretation of 
sustainability values and their implications for global agrifood chains, resulting in a multiplicity 
of approaches of how to deal with sustainability challenges (Dentoni and Peterson 2011). 
Nonetheless, a baseline consensus has been established among stakeholders, which identifies a 
set of unacceptable practices in agricultural production and trade, including child or other forms 
of bonded labor, cutting of primary forest, and severe forms of environmental degradation 
(Bitzer et al. 2012a). The agenda-setting function of partnerships does not only involve the 
emergence of mutual norms and values, but also entails adjustments in the behavior of actors 
towards the recognition of the importance of partnering. NGOs and development agencies have 
become accepted as knowledgeable and credible partners, whilst businesses have taken on an 
active role in sustainability initiatives: Particularly in the coffee and cocoa sectors, several 
multinational companies have been active in sustainability initiatives in an attempt to build core 
competence and demonstrate leadership in addressing sustainability challenges (Dentoni and 
Peterson 2011). Finally, the practice of working directly with farmers and producers’ 
organizations, often through partnerships, has become widespread and institutionalized, denoting 
a clear turning point compared to business practices of up to ten years ago.  
 
Rule-Setting: Creating and Reinforcing the Trend towards Sustainability Standards 
 
Sustainability standards and certification as private rules for agricultural production have 
experienced considerable proliferation in all of the three agrifood chains over recent years – a 
trend which has been absorbed and fuelled by partnerships (Bitzer et al. 2012b). A general 
distinction can be made between two levels of standards, which refers to (i) their main market 
outlets and participating businesses (niche versus mainstream) and (ii) their content (more 
stringent versus broader, more lenient requirements) (Bitzer and Glasbergen 2010). Whilst this 
would amount to a broad classification into four categories of standards, only the combinations 
of niche/more stringent requirements and mainstream/more lenient requirements can be observed 
in practice (see Table 2 below). 
 
The coffee chain exhibits the greatest variation of standards used by partnerships, ranging from 
highly stringent standards (SMBC bird-friendly) to stringent (Fairtrade and organic) to less 
stringent (Rainforest Alliance, Utz Certified) to quality-oriented standards (Starbucks’ C.A.F.E. 
Practices, Nespresso AAA) and, finally, to baseline standards (Common Code for the Coffee 
Community-4C) (see also Table 3). Considering the variety of standards, it would appear that the 
coffee market is saturated in terms of diversity of standards. This might be different in the cocoa 
and cotton sectors, where fewer standards exist. In the global cocoa sector, five standards have 
entered the market (organic, Fair trade, Rainforest Alliance, Utz Certified and Starbucks’ Cocoa 
Practices), but none of them is an explicit baseline standard that covers large parts of the sector. 
In the global cotton sector, two relatively new baseline standards (Cotton made in Africa-CmiA 
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and Better Cotton Initiative-BCI) seek to enter the mainstream market, whereas organic and 
Fairtrade have managed to establish themselves in niche markets at the other end of the market 
spectrum. However, it seems that the middle ground in between is missing, which in the cases of 
coffee and cocoa is taken up by the Rainforest Alliance and Utz Certified standards. Thus, we 
could potentially see movement in this direction, should the consumer demand for more ethical 
cotton be confirmed. 
 
While partnerships use different standards, we can observe a trend towards mainstream-oriented 
standards at the expense of Fairtrade and organic standards (Raynolds et al. 2007; Bitzer et al. 
2008) (see Table 2).  
 
 
Table 2. Broad Classification of Standards Used by Partnerships 
 (More) stringent requirements (More) lenient requirements 
Niche-oriented Mostly “old” sustainability  
standards, including  
Fairtrade, organic, SMBC 
(not observed) 
Mainstream-oriented 
 
(not observed) “New(er)” sustainability standards, 
including Rainforest Alliance, Utz, 
4C, Starbucks Practices, CmiA, BCI, 
Nespresso 
 
This is a twofold trend, indicating that partnerships increasingly use mainstream standards and 
also seek to reach a greater target group of producers. Various factors contribute to this 
‘standardization strategy’ of partnerships in favor of mainstream standards, mainly relating to the 
initiating and/or predominant actor(s) involved in partnerships. Firstly, while even mainstream 
standards only capture small percentages of the global market, they offer greater market potential 
than Fairtrade and organic standards, which are mostly confined to niche markets (Bassett 2009; 
Kolk 2011). Secondly, due to the important role of business in partnerships, increasing emphasis 
is placed on product quality and quantity, which are only minor aspects in Fairtrade and organic 
standards, if considered at all (Muradian and Pelupessy 2005). Thirdly, most companies reject 
the idea of guaranteed minimum prices for producers as required by Fairtrade (Ruben and Zuniga 
2011). This also holds for price premiums, which, in mainstream standards, are either flexible 
and considered to be a matter of negotiation between buyer and supplier, or completely absent. 
Finally, this market-oriented thinking is increasingly accepted or even endorsed by NGOs and 
development agencies (Knorringa and Helmsing 2008). For instance, the certification NGOs of 
Rainforest Alliance and Utz Certified, which both promote mainstream-oriented standards, are 
among the most active partnership initiators. In sum, mainstream standards are characterized by 
a high ‘market compatibility’. 
 
At the same time, the standardization strategy of partnerships is influenced by institutional 
factors at the production level, which facilitate the application of mainstream sustainability 
standards as opposed to Fairtrade and organic standards (Bitzer and Glasbergen 2010). 
Partnerships that use organic and Fairtrade standards often face considerable institutional 
constraints, whereas mainstream sustainability standards fit the existing institutional structures of 
agricultural production, i.e., exhibit a high ‘institutional compatibility’. Such higher institutional 
Bitzer                                                                                                                       Volume15, Special Issue B, 2012 
 
 2012 International Food and Agribusiness Management Association (IFAMA). All rights reserved. 
 
 
22 
compatibility, including less stringent social and/or environmental requirements, allows for a 
relatively fast and large-scale application by producers and increases the potential target group 
(Bitzer and Glasbergen 2010). 
 
Table 3 provides a comparative overview of the standards used by partnerships, further detailing 
their market and institutional compatibility based on six indicators each. 
 
Table 3. Sustainability standards used by partnerships compared 
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Agrifood chain  ▲ ▲ ▲ ▲    ▲  
MARKET COMPATIBILITY LOW LOW LOW MEDIUM HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH 
1. Self-portrayal Niche Niche Niche 
Main-
stream 
Main-
stream 
Main-
stream 
Main-
stream 
Main-
stream 
Main-
stream 
Main-
stream 
2. Quality requirements Low Low Low Low Medium Low Low Low High High 
3. Emphasis on quantity  Low Low Low Low High High High High High High 
4. Traceability Medium Medium Medium Low High Low High Low High Medium 
5. Guaranteed minimum 
price? 
No No Yes No No No No No No No 
6. Price premium for 
compliance? 
Yes 
(set) 
Yes 
(flexible) 
Yes 
(set) 
Yes 
(flexible) 
Yes 
(flexible)  
No No No Possibly No 
INSTITUTIONAL 
COMPATIBILITY 
LOW LOW LOW MEDIUM HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH MEDIUM HIGH 
7. Entry level for producer 
organizations 
High High Low Low Low Low Low Low Medium Medium  
8. Number/stringency of 
environmental criteria 
(apart from national 
regulation) 
High High Medium High Low Low Low Low Medium Low 
9. Number/stringency of 
social criteria (apart from 
national/ILO regulation 
Low Low High Low Low Low Low Low Low Low 
10. Organization of farmers 
required? 
No No Yes No No No No No No No 
11. GMOs allowed? No No No No Yes Yes No Yes No No 
12. Certification or 
verification? 
Cert. Cert. Cert. Cert. Cert. Veri. Veri. Veri. Veri. Veri. 
 
Table 3 also reveals that there is a trade-off between the market compatibility and institutional 
compatibility of standards on the one hand and the number and stringency of environmental 
and/or social requirements on the other hand. This trade-off causes standards to compete with 
each other and most of all, with Fairtrade and organic standards on the definitions of sustainable 
commodities (Bitzer et al. 2008; Visseren-Hamakers and Glasbergen 2007). Despite primarily 
forming part of a type of parallel production by large companies, such partnerships have already 
become part of the power struggle in global agrifood chains.  
 
The application of standards enables partnerships to initiate a change in the coordination used 
among actors along global agrifood chains by commodifying certain sustainability values (Lyon 
Bitzer                                                                                                                       Volume15, Special Issue B, 2012 
 
 2012 International Food and Agribusiness Management Association (IFAMA). All rights reserved. 
 
 
23 
2006). Normal market-based coordination is supplemented with industrial coordination, which 
solves uncertainties about the quality of a product through inspection and certification, and with 
civic coordination, which internalizes social and environmental values into trade, albeit to 
varying degrees (Bitzer et al. 2008). The notion of complementing market-based coordination 
with industrial coordination seems consistent with firms forming a type of non-equity alliance to 
coordinate exchanges between parties along agrifood chains with higher control intensity, but 
without equity exchanges. Following Peterson et al. (2001, 153), the element of third party 
certification (or verification) constitutes “the most extreme ex post control” as ultimate 
enforcement of performance is delegated to a third, external party, exceeding the control of chain 
actors. Fairtrade is the most civic-driven by focusing on changing the governance structures of 
global chains and on empowering smallholder farmers vis-à-vis other chain actors (Renard 
2003). In contrast, most standards used by partnerships are less civic-driven and can instead be 
labeled as business-driven, for they rely on inspection-centered coordination to integrate a basic 
set of environmental and social criteria into trade in reward for a basic price improvement for 
producers. However, as the effects on producers remain ambiguous, the main benefits accrue to 
large companies which are able to use standards to attain their business goals, such as market 
development, chain coordination and strengthening of brands (Muradian and Pelupessy 2005; 
Daviron and Ponte 2005; Giovannucci and Ponte 2005). Thus, standards leave intact the existing 
governance structures of agrifood chains and turn into new mechanisms for supply chain 
governance by large companies (Hatanaka and Busch 2008; Bain 2010). It might even be 
suggested that, while standards were originally designed to constrain the behavior of companies, 
and verify their adherence to a set of sustainability values, the current use of standards creates 
new power imbalances among producers and large buyers (Raynolds 2009). Together with the 
fact that standards compete with each other, this decreases the value of standards as steering 
mechanisms for sustainable development. 
 
Policy Implementation: Working with Smallholder Farmers 
 
Regarding the implementation of sustainability values, partnerships introduce good agricultural 
practices for production and post-harvest processes to increase the skills of smallholder farmers 
and enhance farm management (Ruben and Zuniga 2011). Often this is combined with the use of 
standards and certification to promote a set of rules for sustainable production and to align 
production to global market demand. In this regard, partnerships present a new source of 
technological change in agrifood chains that often fills a vacuum in developing countries where 
many farmers do not have access to adequate information and extension services (Bitzer et al. 
2011). Thus, partnerships fulfill a task that is generally thought to be the responsibility of 
governments and public extension services. 
 
Empirical research has shown that the transfer of technology and application of good agricultural 
practices have resulted in four main benefits for farmers, although there is arguably considerable 
variation in the extent of the benefits at the individual farmers’ level (Bitzer et al. 2011; Bitzer et 
al. 2012b). Firstly, the employment of improved production methods has led to an increase in 
product quality and frequently productivity (cf. Potts et al. 2010; Bassett 2009). Secondly, good 
agricultural practices have improved the environmental performance of farms by adhering to 
basic environmental management practices, including the conservation of soil and water 
resources, the rejection of banned pesticides and the upkeep of primary forest (Perez-Aleman and 
Sandilands 2008; Ruben and Zuniga 2011). Thirdly, partnerships are able to improve the 
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working conditions at the production level and rule out unacceptable practices through the 
application of standards (Manning and Von Hagen 2010). Finally, certification can increase 
farmers’ revenues, as it is often associated with the payment of price premiums (Raynolds et al. 
2007; Potts et al. 2010).  
 
Upscaling: the Creation of Networked Structures 
 
Glasbergen (2011) suggests that the lack of strategic linkages among partnerships using 
standards leads to excessive multiplicity and fragmentation of the global governance system. 
This, in turn, limits their potential for upscaling. However, not all partnerships seek to promote 
chain-wide change by employing standards. A recent research project (Bitzer et al. 2012a), 
however, shows how particularly in the global cocoa sector, many partnerships work on pre-
competitive sustainability challenges, e.g., child labor and poor production practices. Such non 
standard-based partnerships (NSBPs) take up a chain-wide function by establishing ties to one 
another, which are formed through overlapping memberships of organizations and increasingly 
also through institutional linkages between partnerships. The linkages channel the transfer of 
information (e.g. on agricultural production or farmer training), financial resources and services 
(e.g. provision of training to farmers), which reinforce the capacity of individual partnerships. 
Particularly the spread of knowledge and information between NSBPs serves two main purposes. 
Firstly, it helps in creating a common problem definition, for instance, on the issue of child labor. 
Secondly, it supports and steers the activities of individual partnerships. In this regard, the 
dissemination of information takes on a chain-wide governance function and contributes to the 
convergence of partnership activities according to commonly accepted best practices. The 
linkages not only increase the upscaling of overall partnership activities, but also indicate the 
formation of a global network of partnerships, which exists because it is inclusive in terms of 
(industry) members and exclusive in terms of issues that are addressed by partnerships. This 
implies that all powerful industry stakeholders are included in the linkages between partnerships, 
thereby fortifying the power structures of the industry, while competitive issues, such as 
standards, are excluded from the collaboration. Both aspects serve the purpose of avoiding 
internal conflicts of interest. 
 
The impact of the linkages between NSBPs is enhanced through a meta-governance 
organization, such as the World Cocoa Foundation, which strengthens the linkages between 
partnerships by creating a shared vision of a new legitimate cocoa economy. It also provides 
guidance to partnerships by spreading information, setting priorities among sustainability issues 
and lobbying on their behalf. In this manner, the World Cocoa Foundation steers partnerships in 
reference to overall network goals and sustains the broader sustainability efforts of the cocoa 
industry. However, the formation of linkages between partnerships was only possible because the 
competitive issue of standards was deliberately excluded. Thus, NSBPs may address specific 
issues in a pre-competitive manner; yet, they are not able to establish and enforce rules for 
sustainable business behavior. They are also limited in their ability to deal with the existence of 
and competition between different sustainability standards. This exposes the structural fragility 
of the network of partnerships (Bitzer et al. 2012a). 
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The Capacity of Partnerships from a Development Perspective 
 
While the governance perspective is largely positive about partnerships in global agrifood 
chains, various restrictions to the capacity of partnerships become visible when viewing 
partnerships from a development perspective. This perspective studies the capacity of 
partnerships in the context of a ‘development problem’ of agrifood chains, referring to the 
situation at the production level which is characterized by wide-spread poverty, environmental 
degradation and labor exploitation. Seen from this perspective, the capacity of partnerships 
remains limited due to the focus on incremental and not radical change, the ambiguous 
implications of the use of standards for producers, the inability of partnerships to empower 
smallholder farmers, and the questionable durability of partnerships’ achievements. 
 
Agenda-Setting: Questions on the Type of Change Promoted 
 
While partnerships act as important initiators of change, their aim is not to disrupt current 
structures, but rather to adjust these structures within the framework of stakeholder consent, and 
to take the ruling out of inacceptable practices as the starting point for a sustainable trajectory of 
agrifood chains. In line with this argument, Visseren-Hamakers and Glasbergen (2007) suggest 
that some partnerships are merely developed with the aim of slowing down more fundamental 
change. Bain (2010) even asserts that such a reformist approach may modify some mainstream 
agricultural practices, but is ultimately aimed at assuring and projecting large buyers’ economic 
priorities. 
 
The incremental change pursued by partnerships has the advantage of being backed up by 
powerful stakeholders, particularly large corporations, and of fitting into current institutional 
structures (Fuchs et al. 2011). This shows, for instance, in the ‘institutional compatibility’ of 
mainstream-oriented standards, which advocate a process of incremental change based on 
prevalent agricultural practices, and in the institutional bias against Fairtrade and organic 
standards, which demand a shift in thinking on agricultural production (Bitzer and Glasbergen 
2010). This indicates that the institutional environment of partnerships is most conducive to an 
incremental and facile type of change that can easily be applied on a large scale. However, this 
change strategy risks ignoring some of the underlying causes of the development problem of 
global agrifood chains, such as the significant power and resource imbalances between buyers 
and producers, which is causally related to the limited share of value added for producers and the 
exploitative conditions at the production level (cf. Daviron and Ponte 2005; Auld 2010).  
 
Rule-Setting: The Ambiguous Implications of the Use of Sustainability Standards 
 
As mentioned earlier, one of the key functions of partnerships is the use of sustainability 
standards and certification. Whilst there are several advantages associated with this approach, 
such as the promotion of set rules for sustainable production, partnerships also create specific 
problems related to certification burdens. This connects to the recent debate on standards in 
agrifood chains, in which claims and counterclaims are raised as to whether or not standards 
exclude smallholder farmers from potentially lucrative export-oriented markets (e.g. Daviron and 
Ponte 2005; Henson and Humphrey 2009; Jaffee et al. 2011). The core of this debate deals with 
two aspects: firstly, the compliance demands of standards and secondly, the costs of certification 
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(although Jaffee et al. (2011) caution that inclusion/exclusion equally hinges on a number of 
other factors, such as economies of scale and access to inputs). Regarding the first aspect, a 
general consensus has emerged that capacities at the production level are critical for being able 
to comply with the high demands of standard schemes propagated by partnerships and that if 
such capacities do not exist, substantial support for training and extension is essential 
(Mutersbaugh 2002; Bray et al. 2002; Ruben and Zuniga 2011). However, research from the 
coffee chain indicates that partnerships tend to go for the low hanging fruit, and focus their 
support activities on the most capable producers in an effort to ensure economic viability and to 
facilitate quick compliance with standards (Bitzer et al. 2012b). 
 
Concerning the high costs of certification, observers agree that these put considerable financial 
strain on standard adopters, i.e., producer organizations (Henson and Humphrey 2009). With the 
exception of cotton, partnerships neither cover the costs of certification nor provide sufficient 
credit opportunities for producer organizations. Producers themselves are responsible for 
ensuring that they receive certification to demonstrate their compliance with standards. The lack 
of available finances to cover certification costs creates great difficulties for producer 
organizations, and in many cases fortifies their dependence on external donors (Bitzer et al. 
2012b).  
 
Whilst the burdens of conformity, including financial costs and risks, are shifted downstream to 
the production level, the benefits of certification for producers are often uncertain, both in terms 
of price premiums and enhanced market access. Most standards offer, if at all, only flexible price 
premiums which are subject to negotiation, regardless of the efforts of farmers to comply with 
the standards (Daviron and Ponte 2005; Giovannucci and Ponte 2005). Only Fairtrade works 
with guaranteed minimum prices, but since this approach contrasts the market-based formation 
of prices, it is rejected by most partnerships (cf. Ruben and Zuniga 2011). Instead, the premiums 
for certified products are based on process and product quality, negotiation capacity and scarcity. 
However, the last two criteria make it difficult for producers to receive high premiums. On the 
one hand, the negotiation capacity of producers and their organizations is often severely limited 
due to lacking managerial skills (Bitzer et al. 2012b). On the other hand, many certified products 
are already experiencing situations of oversupply. As supply outstrips demand, price premiums 
associated with certified products are bound to decline (Muradian and Pelupessy 2005). This 
confirms that standards do not set in motion a meaningful redistribution of income along 
agrifood chains (Daviron and Ponte 2005).  
 
Moreover, standards do not serve as a guarantee for enhanced market access in the face of 
limited absorption capacities of markets for certified products (Daviron and Ponte 2005). 
Partnerships already face considerable difficulties in finding sufficient buyers for the entire 
‘partnership produce’. As a result, producer organizations are increasingly motivated to 
simultaneously maintain multiple certifications with differing demands to improve their chances 
for favorable market access (Ruben and Zuniga 2011; Bitzer et al. 2012b). Yet, although farmers 
are required to adopt new production techniques, comply with a variety of non-harmonized 
demands, and face high certification costs, improved market access remains elusive in many 
cases. The limited size and high demands of markets for certified products imply that only a 
limited number of farmers can participate (cf. Jaffee et al. 2011). These critical aspects limit the 
sustainability of certification as a business model from a development perspective. 
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Policy Implementation: Working with Producers, but Without Empowerment 
 
The governance perspective observed different benefits of partnerships for producers due to the 
promotion of good agricultural practices. However, partnerships seem to be unable to 
complement this technological change with a more human-centric type of change that focuses on 
the strengthening and empowerment of producer organizations (Bitzer et al. 2012b). Such 
empowerment can be understood in a twofold way, referring to the position of producer 
organizations within a partnership as well as to the position of producer organizations as chain 
actors. Both perspectives reveal a discrepancy between the objectives and claims of partnerships 
and the effects of partnership activities. 
 
While many partnerships, especially in the coffee and cocoa chains, cooperate with producer 
organizations, the latter are often not able to significantly influence the process and outcome of 
partnering (Bitzer et al. 2011). Producer organizations are considered the beneficiaries and 
recipients of partnership interventions instead of actual members. They are chosen by the 
partnership initiators based on already existing relationships, and they are rarely involved in the 
design planning of partnerships (Rein and Stott 2009). Similarly, other actors from producer 
countries are frequently underrepresented in partnerships, whereas actors from consumer 
countries bring in substantial resources, perform critical tasks and are thus able to shape the 
contour and content of partnerships (Dingwerth 2008; Arifin 2010; Fuchs et al. 2011). Such a 
pattern of actors’ representation and roles reproduces existing power imbalances between already 
powerful actors, such as businesses, and actors from producer countries, especially producer 
organizations (Gregoratti 2011). This implies that partnerships are less an expression of an equal 
reconciliation of interests, but rather one of a managerial approach to the sustainability 
challenges of global agrifood chains, wherein influence is granted through individual capabilities 
and resources. As a result, partnerships are mainly business-driven following a demand-oriented 
strategy as opposed to being producer-driven which would facilitate a needs-based strategy. 
 
This situation also limits the capacity of partnerships to strengthen the position of producer 
organizations as chain actors. It is generally acknowledged that the establishment and 
strengthening of producer organizations are associated with several challenges stemming from 
the lack of human, material and financial resources of producer organizations. Partnerships seem 
to recognize the difficult situation of producer organizations and often implement training 
activities to improve managerial and business administration skills. However, the focus of 
partnership activities on farmer training to promote good agricultural practices and sustainability 
standards appears to detract attention from the condition and needs of producer organizations. 
Measures to strengthen producer organizations have been implemented in piecemeal fashion as 
add-ons and with patchy success at best (Bitzer et al. 2012b). Only partnerships that work with 
the Fairtrade label are required to pay special attention to the strengthening of producer 
organizations; for the remaining partnerships producer organizations constitute a means to get 
access to producers and to create economies of scale. The empowerment ideal might be part of 
the rhetoric of partnerships, but largely disappears in practice (Auld 2010). As a consequence, 
producer organizations often continue to struggle with weak financial and human resources, and 
rely on external support to uphold operations. 
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Upscaling: The Uncertain Durability of Partnerships’ Achievements 
 
Finally, the capacity of partnerships to promote sustainable change is restricted due to the 
questionable durability and upscaling potential of partnerships’ achievements (cf. Visseren-
Hamakers et al. 2010). Both appear to be constrained by the focus of many partnership activities 
on certification and by the implementation of activities in a project-like manner within a limited 
timeframe. The focus on certification is associated with high financial burdens for producer 
organizations, and results in a comparatively narrow target group of farmers. The project-like 
trait of partnership activities seems to confine the capacity of partnerships to promoting 
technological change whilst overlooking to a large degree the importance of empowering 
smallholder producers and their organizations to act as self-determining chain actors for the 
uptake and upscaling of partnership activities. Moreover, the shift of technology provision from 
public agencies towards partnerships raises questions about the roles and responsibilities of these 
agencies and other governmental institutions from producer countries once partnership activities 
are terminated. Particularly in the coffee sector, local public agencies are hardly involved in 
partnerships, limiting the ability of partnerships to institutionalize their changes in local practices 
(Bitzer et al. 2008). This problem is less pronounced in the cocoa sector, where similar 
observations on partnerships have been made in the past, and where partnerships have started to 
actively seek the engagement of producer country governments to link up their own activities 
with local initiatives and public agencies (Bitzer et al. 2012a). In a related manner, cotton 
partnerships either include companies with local branch offices or establish ties to public 
extension services to root new technologies in local systems (Bitzer and Glasbergen 2010). 
 
Differences between Partnerships in the Three Chains 
 
Two key differences between partnerships in the three chains investigated can be distinguished 
(see Table 4 for a comparative overview). Firstly, this concerns the role of so-called lead firms, 
i.e., firms that are able to set the parameters under which other actors in the chain operate 
(Humphrey and Schmitz 2001). Particularly in the coffee and cocoa chains, the presence of lead 
firms, such as large coffee roasters and chocolate manufacturers, is well documented (Daviron 
and Ponte 2005; Fold 2002). In these chains, lead firms are generally involved in multiple 
partnerships simultaneously, and have also assumed prominent roles in partnerships in terms of 
initiation, funding and implementation. This has contributed to a mainstreaming of partnerships, 
which, in turn, has paved the way for sustainability values to enter the agenda of big business. At 
the same time, the active role of lead firms creates an imbalance in resources compared to other 
partnership actors, thereby reproducing existing imbalances within these chains. The 
inclusiveness of large business actors is less pronounced in the cotton sector, where fewer 
partnerships are active and clear lead firms are difficult to point out due to long and fragmented 
supply chains and the reduced concentration of market power amongst a limited number of 
companies (Daviron and Gibbon 2002). 
 
Secondly, the three chains differ significantly regarding the development of institutional linkages 
among partnerships for purposes of collaboration and resource exchange. The global cocoa 
sector constitutes a kind of prototype for such linkages among partnerships, whereas the case of 
coffee showed that partnerships compete with each other due to their reliance on sustainability 
standards (Bitzer et al. 2008). Just a few years ago, the cocoa sector was considered to be lagging 
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behind the coffee sector in terms of sustainability efforts, which had significantly more 
partnerships, featured more sustainability standards (with greater market share), and attracted 
more publicity, particularly to the activities of large coffee companies. Since then, the cocoa 
sector has taken a different development path in terms of sustainability initiatives, which 
outshines the achievements of coffee partnerships with respect to the emergence of linkages 
which channel different types of resources among partnerships. The presence of such linkages 
can largely be attributed to the explicit focus of many cocoa partnerships on issues other than 
promoting standards, to the involvement of all large industry stakeholders, and to the 
performance of a meta-governance role by the World Cocoa Foundation. This does not imply 
that institutional linkages among partnerships are completely absent in the coffee and cotton 
chains. However, they do seem to be more unlikely due to the rootedness of most coffee 
partnerships and all cotton partnerships in the use of standards. Moreover, a neutral meta-
governance organization, such as the World Cocoa Foundation, is lacking in both chains. 
 
Table 4. Comparison between the coffee, cotton and cocoa chains 
 Coffee chain Cotton chain Cocoa chain 
Total number of 
partnerships (until 
March 2010) (Bitzer 
2010) 
125 25 55 
Key drivers behind 
partnerships 
Increased pressure on 
companies (e.g. coffee 
crisis, child labor 
allegations); emergence of 
new specialty markets 
Some pioneer companies, 
but mostly conventional 
corporate social 
responsibility policies 
Supply concerns; 
increased pressure on 
companies (child labor 
allegations) 
Role of ‘lead firms’ in 
chains 
From reactive to active 
No clear lead firms; 
generally passive business 
behavior 
From reactive to active 
Engagement of lead 
firms in partnerships 
Common; often multiple 
partnerships at the same 
time 
No clear lead firms; slowly 
increasing engagement of 
big textile companies 
Common; often multiple 
partnerships at the same 
time 
Mainstreaming of 
partnerships? 
Yes No Yes 
Institutional linkages 
among partnerships 
Hardly (due to competition 
between standards) 
Hardly (due to competition 
between standards and 
lack of mainstreaming of 
partnerships) 
Yes, particularly between 
non-standard based 
partnerships 
Meta-governance 
organization 
coordinating different 
partnerships? 
No No 
Yes, the World Cocoa 
Foundation 
 
 
Discussion and Conclusion: Partnerships and the Neoliberal Agenda 
 
Partnerships can mostly be seen as reactions to government and market failures which result in 
various sustainability challenges of global agrifood chains. From a governance perspective, the 
emergence of partnerships is largely positive inasmuch as partnerships act as initiators and 
agents of change which, although still mostly confined to niche markets, unfolds a chain-wide 
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governance effect. From a development perspective, the positive effects of partnerships are 
rather indirect and ambiguous. Several aspects of partnerships can be viewed critically and 
challenge their capacity to promote sustainable change. These differing conclusions on the 
capacity of partnerships can be explained by the fact that partnerships fit into and largely 
embody the neoliberal agenda (Blowfield and Dolan 2008; Utting and Zammit 2009), which 
raises specific questions, particularly from a development perspective. Here, we do not refer to 
the neoliberal project of the 1980s and early 1990s, propagating privatization, liberalization and 
deregulation, but rather to the subsequent process of what Peck and Tickell (2002) refer to as 
‘roll-out neoliberalization’, i.e. extending the legitimacy of neoliberalism, including the 
efficiency of private enterprises and market-based solutions to social and environmental issues.  
 
The article revealed that the neoliberal agenda is mirrored in three key conceptual underpinnings 
of partnerships, which each create considerable friction with certain development objectives. 
Firstly, partnerships, in a reciprocal interplay, promote as well as reflect the increased 
importance of businesses, but also of stakeholders from civil society. While this is suggested to 
counteract the insufficient reach and enforcement of traditional governmental approaches, the 
endeavor of exploiting the changing role of business in society seems to result in partnerships 
being increasingly driven by businesses that are able to strategically use partnerships to address 
concerns relevant to them and to expand their sphere of influence on sustainable development 
issues (Gregoratti 2011). Secondly, partnerships epitomize the decreased importance of 
governments, since governments, particularly from producer countries, are conspicuously 
underrepresented in partnerships, and since partnerships primarily act as change agents at the 
global and local levels, but not at the national level. This risks leading to the exclusion of 
governments from shaping the notion of development, and it implies that important decisions 
regarding production issues are often made far away from the actual country of production 
(Schouten and Glasbergen 2011). Thirdly, partnerships represent a managerial approach to 
solving sustainability challenges, which can best be seen in the popularity of standards among 
many partnerships. However, standards do not represent neutral tools, but rather typify new 
social practices that have ambiguous implications for producers and serve to focus on particular 
issues, while detracting attention from other issues (Hatanaka and Busch 2008). 
 
This neoliberal orientation of partnerships appears to result in a depoliticized agenda-setting, 
which marginalizes certain development concerns, such as the issue of smallholder 
empowerment, the costs and benefits of different certification schemes, or the implications for 
the poorest segment of producers. Other concerns are not addressed at all, such as the patterns of 
power and resource distribution underlying global agrifood chains. The dominance of business 
objectives over development concerns shows that partnerships are constrained in their capacity to 
reshape the relationship between business and development without external incentives. 
Ultimately, they might adjust current structures, but it is unlikely that the incremental change 
pursued by many partnerships would lead to more fundamental change.  
 
This should not be taken as a plea against the involvement of business in partnerships. Rather, 
this discussion aims to highlight the tensions within partnerships due to the difficult relationship 
between the neoliberal orientation of partnerships and certain development objectives. The 
comparison of partnerships from two distinct perspectives revealed that partnerships pursue a 
pragmatic view of sustainable change, which is subject to different limitations, and is not able to 
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fully capture the conditional nature of positive development outcomes. This calls for a re-
conceptualization of partnerships and their underlying assumptions to change the way that they 
construct the relationship between business and development. Partnerships are not ‘wrong’, but 
insufficient and therefore, renewed attention should be paid to the gaps in the solutions provided 
by partnerships. 
 
Businesses cannot be expected to commence such a re-conceptualization against their self-
interests and their framing of problems. As Knorringa and Helmsing (2008: 1059) argue: “Firms 
have no interest in […] a focus on development impacts beyond what they need in terms of 
verifiable information to satisfy their stakeholders”. Participation in partnerships makes good 
business sense on a variety of grounds and can be helpful in gaining or maintaining competitive 
advantage. On the one hand, corporate engagement is important for their license to operate by 
portraying responsible business behavior to consumers, investors, business partners and society 
at large. On the other hand, involvement in partnerships can result in concrete deliverables, such 
as developing new markets and products, securing supply, coordinating supply chains and 
mitigating risks. Although no information exists on the actual benefits gained by businesses 
through their engagement in partnerships, the fact that businesses have been so successful in 
determining the agenda of partnerships, including the use of standards, may indicate that most 
existing partnerships are the best governance mechanism for achieving the sustainability goals of 
businesses. 
 
So the question remains, which other actors could stimulate and nurture a renewed 
conceptualization of partnerships? Governments, as noted throughout the partnership literature, 
are hardly or only sporadically involved in partnerships, and mostly lack a strategic and 
coordinated approach to partnerships. This leaves us with NGOs, despite the significant criticism 
they have received, among others as regards their effectiveness and accountability in 
development efforts, and despite their shortcomings in addressing these criticisms. Yet, given 
their active role in initiating the partnership trend by challenging firm behavior, it would appear 
that it depends mostly on NGOs to re-politicize their interactions with businesses in order to 
achieve a broader framing of the sustainability problems than businesses are willing to endorse. 
Furthermore, their position as intermediaries between state, market and citizens, as 
intermediaries between different countries and levels of global-local action, and as intermediaries 
between vision and pragmatism (Edwards 2011) might make them well-suited to embrace the 
challenge of reconceptualization. Again, this does not imply that NGOs should collectively 
abandon the collaborative approach towards business and resort back to campaigning, naming 
and shaming. As Edward and Tallontire (2009, p. 830) point out, re-politicization is about 
creative contestation in lieu of antagonistic confrontation and should therefore not be interpreted 
as anti-business behavior. Rather, it entails a renewed, deliberate and independent problem 
analysis in terms of what the sustainability challenges of global agrifood chains are, what kind of 
change would be necessary to overcome these challenges, how this change could come about, 
either through partnerships or through alternative action, and what the roles of the different 
stakeholders in these pathways could be.  
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